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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to estimate the costs of banking 
sector restructuring in Poland, borne by the government 
and  the  central  bank  in  the  years  1993-2006.  The 
authors  focused  mainly  on  the  assistance  measures 
that directly contributed to generating costs. Aggregated   
costs  of  the  banking  sector  restructuring  borne  in 
the  years  1993-2006  by  public  bodies  amounted  to 
18.6  billion  zloty  (22.4  billion  zloty  in  2006  prices), 
corresponding to 2.61% of the annual GDP. The largest 
costs  related  to  the  tools  employed  in  the  banking 
sector  restructuring  process  were  those  of  servicing 
restructuring bonds allocated by the State Treasury to 
finance threatened banks (over 80% of total costs). The 
largest share of assistance went to state-owned banks, 
i.e. 90.3% in current prices. Total costs of banking sector 
restructuring in Poland are not high when compared to 
such costs in other transition countries.
Keywords: banking sector restructuring, banking crises, 
fiscal costs, financial stability
JEL: G21, G34, H81
Streszczenie
Celem  tego  opracowania  jest  oszacowanie  kosztów 
restrukturyzacji  polskiego  sektora  bankowego 
poniesionych przez rząd i bank centralny w latach 1993–
2006. Autorzy skupili się przede wszystkim na działaniach 
pomocowych,  które  generowały  bezpośrednie  koszty. 
Zagregowane koszty restrukturyzacji sektora bankowego 
poniesione  w  latach  1993–2006  przez  instytucje 
publiczne wyniosły 18,6 mld zł (22,4 mld zł w cenach   
z 2006 r.), co odpowiada 2,61% rocznego PKB. Wśród 
instrumentów  zastosowanych  do  restrukturyzacji 
sektora bankowego w Polsce największe koszty wynikały 
z  konieczności  obsługi  obligacji  restrukturyzacyjnych 
przekazanych przez Skarb Państwa wybranym bankom 
mającym  problemy  (ponad  80%  łącznych  kosztów). 
Udział  nominalnych  kosztów  pomocy  dla  banków 
państwowych  w  całkowitych  kosztach  wyniósł  aż 
90,3%. Łączne koszty restrukturyzacji banków w Polsce 
nie  były  wysokie  w  porównaniu  z  innymi  krajami 
przechodzącymi transformację z gospodarki centralnie 
planowanej do gospodarki rynkowej.
Słowa  kluczowe:  restrukturyzacja  sektora  bankowego, 
kryzysy bankowe, koszty fiskalne, stabilność finansowa 
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1.  Introduction
In almost all Central and Eastern European countries a 
major challenge of the systemic transition was posed by 
the restructuring of the banking sectors. These sectors 
were not adapted to operate in free market conditions. 
Money  played  a  passive  role  in  centrally-controlled 
economies, i.e. cash flows followed the flows of goods 
which prevented the development of institutions inherent 
in  a  market  economy  (Wyczański,  Gołajewska  1996). 
Therefore, the insufficient development and weakness 
of the banking sectors in all transition countries was one 
of the key barriers for privatisation and further economic 
development. 
Shortage of capital, balance sheets swelling with bad 
loans, and the shortage of funds to support development 
were the main weaknesses of the banking system at the 
time.  The  weaknesses  were  accompanied  by  the  lack 
of experience and shortage of qualified personnel both 
in  banks  and  state  administration  agencies.  Although 
the banking sector in Poland started to develop rapidly 
in  the  early  1990s,  the  above-mentioned  factors  led 
to the need of an intervention by the government and 
other  public  authorities  to  fend  off  a  systemic  crisis. 
Assistance  measures  involved  substantial  costs  –  the 
main burden in the initial phase of the transition was 
carried  by  the  government  and  the  central  bank,  and 
in subsequent years – by the newly established deposit 
insurance fund. 
The aim of this paper is to estimate the costs of the 
banking sector restructuring borne by the government 
and the central bank1 in the years 1993–2006. When 
analysing the restructuring of Polish banks, the authors 
focused  mainly  on  the  assistance  measures  which 
contributed directly to cost generation. Changes in the 
laws, regulations, and institutional environment are not 
discussed in the paper, or are presented very briefly.
The  paper  extends  previous  research  in  at  least 
three directions. First, contrary to some earlier studies 
it  carefully  describes  the  method  used  to  calculate 
the  costs  of  the  Polish  banking  system  restructuring 
(Kawalec 1999; Tang et al. 2000; Zoli 2001; Sherif 2003; 
Caprio,  Klingebiel  2003).  This  is  especially  important 
when comparing costs of international crises. 
Second,  similarly  to  Iwanicz-Drozdowska  (2002, 
pp. 243–257) this article provides a detailed description 
of  different  types  of  costs  borne  by  the  Treasury  and 
the NBP. However, our study uses a different method to 
calculate these costs. Instead of adding nominal values 
of loans, bonds, other funds and interest paid on these 
funds to problem banks, it aims at calculating the net 
costs borne by the Treasury and NBP after controlling 
1  The paper does not take into account the costs borne by the Bank Guarantee 
Fund (BFG) because a major part of these costs was incurred by the banking 
sector, whereas public institutions contributed only a smaller part of the costs 
(NBP’s share in payments to the assistance fund). Moreover, these costs were 
much lower than the costs incurred by the State Treasury and the NBP.  
for the income generated from these instruments (e.g., 
the  sale  of  bank  shares).2  The  opportunity  costs  are 
calculated  in  cases,  where  funds  are  lent  to  banks  at 
interest  rates  lower  than  the  market  rate  (e.g.  costs 
related  to  promissory  notes  and  the  redemption  of 
banks’ bonds). To the authors’ best knowledge no other 
research on the Polish banking restructuring takes these 
costs into account. 
Third, the study presents results on costs calculated 
in current prices, in real terms (i.e. in 2006 prices) and 
in relation to GDP in each year. These three approaches 
are  used  in  order  to  account  for  significant  price 
changes over the years 1993–2006 in our analysis and to 
make the results comparable with international crises. 
Moreover,  the  paper  describes  the  share  of  specific 
assistance instruments in the total cost, identifies the 
largest beneficiaries of the state assistance, and presents 
the distribution of the restructuring cost in time. 
Section 2 of this paper describes the early phase of 
bank operations in a market economy environment and 
Section 3 presents the origins of financial problems in 
the banking sector. Section 4 discusses the methods of 
providing  assistance  to  bankruptcy-threatened  banks, 
and  Section  5  presents  the  calculation  of  the  cost  of 
such  assistance.  The  last  section,  Section  6,  presents 
main conclusions.
2. Transformation of the banking system  
in Poland
Organisational and legislative measures whose goal was 
to  develop  a  new  model  of  the  Polish  banking  sector 
were  taken  at  the  end  of  the  1980s,  even  before  the 
economic  transition  was  initiated  (Baka  et  al.  1997). 
By  that  time,  the  banking  sector  in  Poland  had  a 
monobank  character  –  the  superior  role  was  played 
by  the  National  Bank  of  Poland  (NBP)  in  which  the 
features  of  a  central  bank  and  a  commercial  bank 
operating local branches country-wide were combined. 
In addition, there were 4 commercial banks in Poland, 
i.e.  Powszechna  Kasa  Oszczędności  Bank  Państwowy 
(PKO BP), Bank Gospodarki Żywnościowej (BGŻ), Bank 
Polska Kasa Opieki SA (PEKAO SA), and Bank Handlowy 
SA,  which  carried  out  certain  specialised  functions. 
Business areas of these banks were defined in such a way 
2  For example, Zoli (2001), Caprio, Klingebiel (2003) and Iwanicz-Drozdowska 
(2002, pp. 252–253) take into account the value of restructuring bonds of series 
A, B, C and D granted to banks in the period 1993–1996 when calculating the 
amount of assistance to these banks in that period. In our paper the actual trans-
fers of interest and principal in each year are used, which allows us to calculate 
the final costs more accurately. The difference in accuracy is significant here, 
because the nominal value of bonds equalled PLN 4.70 billion, while the actual 
principal paid in the period 1993–1996 amounted to PLN 0.65 billion and in the 
period 1993–2006 it totalled PLN 10.76 billion. There exist other differences in 
results possibly due to different sources of data, more information about costs 
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so as not to overlap, which allowed to avoid competition 
(Wyczański  2007,  p.  62).  In  the  second  half  of  the 
1980s, the following new banks were established: Bank 
Rozwoju Eksportu SA (BRE Bank SA), Bank Inicjatyw 
Gospodarczych  SA  (BIG  SA),  and  the  Łódzki  Bank 
Rozwoju SA (ŁBR SA). In a centrally-planned system a 
banking system did not practically exist in Poland, being 
replaced by bank administration structures. Enterprises 
could not freely choose a bank branch to service them, 
while banks themselves were functioning as cash desks 
since credit decisions were taken by state administration 
that did not take into account the results of borrowers’ 
credit-worthiness  analyses  (Balcerowicz,  Bratkowski 
2001).
  The  fundamental  goal  of  the  Polish  banking 
sector’s reform was to transform banks into the core of 
the financial system and the most important source of 
funding  for  enterprises  (CASE  2001).  Two  laws  were 
adopted  in  January  1989  which  outlined  the  general 
framework of the banking system in Poland: the Banking 
Act, and the Act on the National Bank of Poland. Under 
the new law, the NBP became a central bank in a strict 
sense,  performing  the  functions  of  an  issuing  bank, 
and  a  credit,  settlement,  and  foreign  currency  central 
institution.  The  NBP  was  also  assigned  responsibility 
for  supervising  the  banking  sector.  In  order  to  boost 
market competition, operating branches, which offered 
deposit and credit services, were spun off from the NBP 
to form 9 regional commercial banks. In the second half 
of 1989 and in January 1990 restrictions related to the 
type of entities serviced, activity profile and territorial 
restrictions were lifted and conditions for banking sector 
entry were liberalised. Overall, the above measures were 
intended to provide institutional environment encouraging 
competition  among  banks.  As  a  result,  the  monobank 
system was abolished and a free market, two-tier system 
was introduced (Wyczański 2007, p. 63).
3. The origins of problems in the banking 
sector
In the early 1990s, the NBP pursued a liberal policy on 
bank  business  licensing.  The  priority  was  to  provide 
conditions for market initiative and opening of private 
banks,  which  was  expected  to  boost  competition  in 
the banking sector. As a result, in the years 1989–1991   
a number of new banks were established. In 1989, twelve 
new banks started activities, in 1990 – 40, and in 1991 
– 17. Most of them were small banks usually opened 
by state-owned enterprises and local governments. By 
the  end  of  1991,  Poland  had  82  domestic  banks  and   
3 branches of international banks (Wyczański, Gołajewska 
1996, p. 19).
The  country  was  short  of  capital,  therefore  the 
newly-established  private  banks  usually  had  a  small 
capital base, insignificant assets and personnel, and poor 
know-how. With time it led to problems in this group of 
banks  which  required  central  bank  intervention  and 
remedial  action.  However,  the  problems  encountered 
in  the  banks,  whose  share  in  the  assets  of  the  whole 
banking sector was small, did not pose a systemic threat, 
although  their  potential  bankruptcy  could  undermine 
confidence in the whole banking sector.
The Banking Act opened the market also to foreign 
investors  who  were  additionally  offered  special 
incentives  in  the  form  of  tax  exemptions.  At  first 
international banks showed small interest in the Polish 
market mainly because of the unstable macroeconomic 
situation and Poland’s low credibility on international 
markets.
The main source of problems in the Polish banking 
sector in the early 1990s was not only the newly-established 
private banks, but primarily large state-owned banks. This 
was caused to a great extent by a heavy burden of state 
enterprises’  bad  loan  portfolios  inherited  from  the  old 
regime.  The  condition  of  state  enterprises  deteriorated 
even further in the early 1990s as they found it difficult 
to  adjust  to  the  new  economic  environment  and  cope 
with competitive imported goods and the mushrooming 
private companies. State-owned enterprises suffered as a 
result of lower demand for their products caused by the 
decline in real wages3 on the one hand, and because of the 
dramatic rise in the cost of credit resulting from interest 
rates growth, on the other hand. The difficult situation of 
these enterprises led to delays in loan repayment which 
deteriorated the financial condition of state-owned banks 
which serviced them. 
Financial  problems  of  the  banking  sector  were 
aggravated by internal factors of the banks themselves, 
such  as:  inadequate  credit  procedures,  difficulties  in 
assessing  potential  borrowers’  financial  condition,   
shortage  of  experienced  personnel,  weak  control 
mechanisms,  the  lack  of  proper  regulations  within 
credit portfolio assessment and the mismatch of credit 
supply and demand (Iwanicz-Drozdowska 2002, p. 231). 
Problems  experienced  by  state-owned  banks  became 
apparent  at  the  end  of  1991,  when  the  share  of  bad 
loans  represented  34.8%  of  their  portfolio.  While  in 
June  1990  the  share  of  bad  loans  ranged  from  9%  to 
20% in these banks, in June 1992, it grew to 24%-86%. 
It  became  clear  that  Poland  was  seriously  threatened 
by  a  banking  crisis  (Balcerowicz,  Bratkowski  2001). 
The  above  mentioned  problems  came  to  full  light  in 
1993 when the banking sector posted a loss resulting 
mostly from the deterioration of credit portfolios and the 
need to make specific reserves for claims. The difficult 
situation  in  the  banking  sector  required  intervention 
by public institutions in order to maintain confidence 
in  the  newly-developed  banking  system  and  protect 
households’ deposits.
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4. Assistance programs for the banking sector
At  the  time  when  Poland  began  the  process  of  bank 
restructuring, the mainstream approach was to establish 
a separate entity (with or without a banking license) and 
transfer bad loans out of existing banks into this “hospital 
bank” (Szelągowska 2004). More active methods applied 
in Poland proved to be successful and were used in other 
countries later on. The banking sector received support 
from the State Treasury, the central bank and, after 1994, 
from the Bank Guarantee Fund. The State Treasury focused 
on helping to restructure state banks that had a significant 
share of bad loans dating back to the period of centrally-
planned economy, whereas the NBP saved primarily other 
than state-owned banks which started operations in the 
transition  period.  Both  the  State  Treasury  and  the  NBP 
offered  assistance  to  co-operative  banks  sector  whose 
problems surfaced with some delay.4
4.1. State Treasury assistance
The  adoption  of  two  laws:  the  Act  on  financial 
restructuring of enterprises and banks,5 and the Act on 
4  These measures, for instance, consisted in amending the Banking Act, in-
troducing new supervisory regulations, and establishing the Bank Guarantee 
Fund. 
5  The political economy dimension of the whole process was important in de-
fining the forms of restructuring. Banks were perceived by the general public as 
very wealthy institutions at that time, so any idea of public funds spent on them 
required a lot of clever marketing. That was a major reason for combining re-
structuring of banks and enterprises within a uniform framework (both in legal 
framework and in financial rules).
Cooperative  Banks  and  BGŻ  Restructuring6  played  a 
key role in solving the difficult situation in the sector 
of state-owned banks. The former Act, often called the 
“debt restructuring law” was the response of the state 
to  the  consequences  of  a  systemic  transition  which 
hit  both  state-owned  enterprises  and  banks.  Under 
this law the State Treasury became co-responsible for 
the bad loans granted before 1992 and banks received 
financial  support  in  the  form  of  restructuring  bonds. 
The bonds were intended to increase the banks’ capital 
base and help them make the required reserves for non-
performing loans (Iwanicz-Drozdowska 2002).
The restructuring bonds program covered a total of 
10 banks: PKO BP, Pekao SA, BGŻ and 7 banks out of the 
“nine” (banks)7. The bonds were issued in four series in 
the years 1993-1994 and two other series in 1996. Table 
1 lists the banks that received financial support in the 
form of restructuring bonds and specifies the dates and 
values of each issue.
The restructuring bonds were issued in the form of 
15-year securities payable in 28 six-month instalments 
after  a  1.5-year  grace  period.  Their  interest  rate  was 
equal  to  the  average  NBP  rediscount  rate  in  a  given 
interest period. The banks involved were paid an interest 
of 5 percentage points, and a proportional part of the 
6  This law introduced a three-tier structure of co-operative banking sector: the 
national bank (BGŻ transformed into a joint stock company), regional banks, 
and co-operative banks.
7 Restructuring bonds were not granted, for formal reasons, to Wielkopolski 
Bank Kredytowy SA and Bank Śląski SA, as they had been privatised before the 
adoption of the Act.
Table 1. Value of restructuring bonds granted to banks in the period 1993–1996
Series Banks Face value of bonds received
(in millions of zloty) Date of issue
A
Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy w Lublinie SA 179.021
30.07.1993
Bank Gdański SA 160.959
Bank Przemysłowo-Handlowy SA w Krakowie 159.843
Bank Zachodni we Wrocławiu SA 144.506
Pomorski Bank Kredytowy SA w Szczecinie 136.367
Powszechny Bank Gospodarczy SA w Łodzi 125.639
Powszechny Bank Kredytowy SA w Warszawie 193.665
Total “Seven” banks 1,100.000
B Powszechna Kasa Oszczędności Bank Państwowy 573.420 16.12.1993
C Bank Gospodarki Żywnościowej  426.580 29.12.1993
D
Bank Gospodarki Żywnościowej* 1,530.000 21.11.1994
Bank Polska Kasa Opieki SA 370.000 21.11.1994
– Bank Gospodarki Żywnościowej SA 600.000 23.09.1996
– Bank Gospodarki Żywnościowej SA 100.000 19.12.1996
Total 4,700.000
* Part of the bonds was earmarked for co-operative banks and for opening regional banks. 
Source: Ordinance of the Minister of Finance dated July 27, 1993, on defining the banks to which Treasury bonds will be extended and on the division of the amount allocated in the budget law for increasing the 
banks’ capital base and reserves (Journal of Laws July 31, 1993), Ordinance of the Minister of Finance dated September 19, 1996, on the issue of bonds earmarked for increasing the capital base of Bank Gospodarki 
Żywnościowej SA (Official Journal of the Ministry of Finance, September 20, 1996), and Ordinance of the Minister of Finance dated December 16, 1996, on the issue of bonds earmarked for increasing the capital 
base of Bank Gospodarki Żywnościowej SA (Official Journal of the Ministry of Finance, December 18, 1996).Bank i kredyt sierpień-wrzesień 2007 88 Financial Markets and Institutions
principal, while the remaining interest was capitalized. 
NBP was the issuing agent of the restructuring bonds 
and  the  bonds  were  to  be  redeemed  according  to  a 
15-year schedule (because of a chronic budget deficit) 
(Wyczański, Gołajewska 1996).
Another  assistance  measure  offered  by  the  State 
Treasury  was  capital  injections  granted  to  PKO  BP 
(December 2000) and BGŻ (May 2002) in the form of 
listed companies’ shares which the banks could sell. It 
should be noted that the transfer of shares represented a 
cost to the State Treasury only in the case of PKO BP. In 
the case of BGŻ, the State Treasury received the bank’s 
shares  in  exchange  for  the  shares  in  State  Treasury 
companies.
4.2. Assistance measures provided by the National Bank of Poland
In  the  years  1993–1995,  in  addition  to  assistance 
measures provided by the State Treasury, the National 
Bank  of  Poland  carried  out  activities  that  focused 
on  supporting  restructuring  programs  in  bankruptcy-
threatened domestic non-state and co-operative banks. 
The central bank did not provide financial support to 
state-owned  banks  in  the  process  of  privatisation,  it 
only  supported  domestic  non-state  and  co-operative 
banks.  Deposits  held  by  such  banks  were  not  subject 
to explicit State Treasury or other institution guarantee 
until 1994. In the first half of the 1990s, Poland did not 
have a universal deposit insurance scheme. The Banking 
Act maintained the existing responsibility of the State 
Treasury but only in the case of saving deposits kept 
in state banks.8 This regulation limited State Treasury 
guarantees to a selected group of banks and to deposits 
held  by  individuals.  As  the  two-tier  banking  sector 
developed, many private and mixed-capital banks were 
established. However, pursuant to the law, they were not 
covered  by  any  guarantees  whatsoever.  This  distorted 
competition between banks as banks protected by the 
Treasury  were  privileged  in  comparison  to  the  newly 
established private banks (Baka 2005).
Overall, during the period 1993–1995, the NBP was 
involved in the restructuring of 13 commercial banks. 
These  were,  however,  relatively  small  banks,  none  of 
them holding more than 1% of the banking sector assets 
at the time. The criterion the central bank applied was 
the stability of the whole financial system and retaining 
public  confidence  in  the  banking  sector  rather  than 
a  purely  economic  calculation  (Iwanicz-Drozdowska 
2002,  p.  247–255).  Confidence  in  the  Polish  banking 
sector in the early 1990s was low. There were fears that 
any rumour of a bank failure might trigger a bank run 
resulting in mass withdrawals of the deposited funds.
NBP  intervention  measures  in  relation  to  banks 
facing  bankruptcy  consisted  in  extending  direct  and 
8 And also in other banks which had received protection before the Act became 
effective.
indirect capital support, as well as providing liquidity. 
The central bank assistance was granted in the following 
forms:
– re-financing credit to replenish bank funds (1992–
1994),
– exemption from the reserve requirement,
– purchase of promissory notes of the restructured 
banks,
– purchase of bonds issued by banks,
– purchase of restructured banks’ shares.
Granting  the  latter  four  forms  of  assistance  to 
a  bank  was  conditional  on  its  implementation  of  a 
restructuring  program;  before  such  a  program  was 
implemented  the  NBP  had  been  offering  re-financing 
credit  only.  In  addition,  in  a  vast  majority  of  cases   
the-least-cost criterion was adopted – the central bank 
avoided granting assistance that exceeded the value of 
deposits kept in each bank involved.9
Legal  grounds  for  extending  NBP  financial   
support to restructuring programs in banks after 1993 
were provided by the decision of the NBP Management 
Board adopted on May 25, 1993, on using the following 
instruments  of  bank  restructuring:  purchase  of  shares 
and long-term bank bonds, and securitisation promissory 
notes.  Moreover,  a  resolution  passed  by  the  Sejm 
(Polish  Parliament)  on  March  5,  1994  regarding  the 
assumptions  for  the  monetary  policy,  required  the 
NBP to undertake measures to strengthen the financial 
standing, operating efficiency, and consolidation of the 
banking  system  with  the  use  of  the  above-mentioned 
instruments and by allocating up to 300 million zloty 
for  the  purpose.  Out  of  the  amount  approved  by  the 
Sejm  259.79  million  zloty10  was  spent  on  assistance 
and 5.8 million zloty – on restructuring programs in co-
operative banks. Agreements signed between the NBP 
and the restructured banks defined, among other things, 
the objective, the type and size of the assistance, as well 
as  the  bond  and  promissory  note  redemption  dates, 
and  the  final  deadline  for  settling  the  central  bank’s 
assistance.  
The  National  Bank  of  Poland  commenced  the 
banking sector financial support program in 1993 when 
its assistance was granted to the Łódzki Bank Rozwoju 
SA.  Next,  in  the  years  1993–1994,  the  central  bank 
acquired  shares  in  Pierwszy  Komercyjny  Bank  SA  in 
Lublin (PKB SA), Prosper Bank SA and Interbank SA. 
The top priority issue from the systemic point of view 
was  granting  support  to  PKB  SA  since  the  disclosure 
of  the  bank’s  financial  problems  stirred  a  temporary 
panic among depositors. In order to retain confidence 
in  the  banking  sector,  mainly  private  banks,  the  NBP 
intervened by acquiring the bank’s shares and extending 
a  financial  support  in  the  form  of  purchase  of  bonds 
and credit in the form of promissory notes. This was the 
9 Based on information from NBP’s Domestic Operations Department.
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first case of the central bank taking over a private bank. 
The National Bank of Poland held PKB SA shares until   
November 1998, when it sold them to Powszechny Bank 
Kredytowy SA. 
Subsequently, the NBP helped to merge 4 other banks 
– 3 with PKB SA and 1 with Prosper Bank. Simultaneously, 
it  offered  financial  support  to  a  bank  that  decided  to 
acquire  a  bankruptcy-threatened  bank.  The  NBP  also 
bought bonds from: PKB SA, Prosper Bank SA, ŁBR SA and 
Interbank SA. Interest on the bonds and promissory note 
credits was fixed at the level of 1% per year.  
  The  nominal  value  of  funds  transferred  by  the 
NBP to commercial banks facing bankruptcy (purchase 
of  shares,  bonds,  and  promissory  notes)  totalled 
555.12 million  zloty.  In  addition,  the  central  bank   
allocated 125.9 million zloty in promissory note credit to 
support banks which acquired the threatened co-operative 
banks.  These  amounts,  however,  did  not  represent 
the  cost  of  support  granted  to  threatened  banks  but   
were the nominal value of funds transferred to the banks 
in  exchange  for  their  shares,  bonds  and  promissory   
notes. In subsequent years the NBP benefited financially 
from  holding  the  bonds  and  promissory  notes,  and   
selling the shares. These benefits were smaller, however, 
than  expenditures  because  the  bonds  and  promissory 
note credits bore preferential interest, and the central 
bank  had  to  carry  out  open  market  operations  to 
absorb increased liquidity from the banking system. The 
estimated  NBP  costs  resulting  from  the  restructuring 
program are shown in sub-section 5.2. 
After 1994, the central bank also used exemptions 
from  the  reserve  requirement  as  an  instrument 
supporting  the  financial  condition  of  commercial  and 
co-operative  banks.  Until  the  end  of  1997,  the  bank   
applied this solution on the grounds of the January 31, 
1989, NBP Act,11 and from 1998 onwards – on the grounds 
of  the  August  29,  1997  NBP  Act.12  The  central  bank 
granted the last of such exemptions in 2000. Overall, 28 
commercial banks and 254 co-operative banks benefited 
from  the  arrangement.13  The  banks  were  obligated 
to  invest  the  exempted  funds  in  Treasury  securities.   
Since  the  exempted  funds  increased  the  banking 
sector’s liquidity,14 the NBP had to conduct open market 
operations  to  keep  liquidity  at  an  appropriate  level. 
The  reserve  requirement  was  interest-free  until  April 
2004.  Therefore,  exemptions  generated  costs  for  the 
NBP resulting from open market operations. The NBP 
costs resulting from reserve requirement exemptions are 
presented in sub-section 5.2.
11 Art. 30, section 4.
12 Art. 39, section 3.
13 Since May 2004, interest on the reserve requirement funds has been equal 
to market rate (0.9 of the rediscount rate) which reduces NBP costs incurred by 
exempting banks from the reserve requirement. Only one commercial bank was 
exempted in this period.
14 These operations of the NBP were not the main source of the banking sec-
tor over-liquidity. Structural over-liquidity in Polish banks after 1995 resulted 
mainly from FX transactions conducted by the central bank.
 In  addition,  in  the  years  1993-1994  the  NBP 
offered  specific  purpose  refinancing  credit  bearing  a 
market interest rate to solvency-threatened banks under 
receivership, to help them replenish their funds.15 The 
value of credit made available to the banks at that time 
totalled 209.5 million zloty. These credits were paid back 
by the banks according to a repayment schedule. Agrobank 
SA was the only exception: it paid back only 4.5 million 
zloty of the 6 million zloty loan, with the value of the 
loan principal unpaid by the bankrupt bank accounting 
for only 0.8% of the total value of credits. Owing to the 
fact that credit exposures to banks bore a market interest   
rate the cost for the NBP was only the unpaid principal 
of the loan extended to Agrobank SA.  
In September 1996, the NBP converted 67.5 million 
zloty  of  the  re-financing  credit  for  central  investment 
into a subordinate loan for BGŻ SA (Iwanicz-Drozdowska 
2002, p. 248). The loan, bearing 1% interest, was repaid 
by the end of 2004. 
The central bank’s assistance took a specific form 
in the case of restructuring the PKO BP bank. The NBP 
exempted this bank from the 800 million zloty reserve 
requirement  for  one  year  starting  January  2,  2001.  In 
addition, NBP bought PKO BP’s bonds with a total face   
value  of  3.2  billion  zloty  bearing  inflation-indexed 
interest. PKO BP invested a total of 4 billion zloty in a 
3-month revolving time deposit in NBP and the one-year 
income from the deposit was transferred to the bank’s 
account. Moreover, PKO BP bought three equal tranches 
of 91-day NBP money bills with a nominal value of 7.5 
billion  zloty.  Subsequently,  the  bills  were  rolled  over 
three  times.  In  December  2000,  PKO  BP  received  a 
capital injection from the State Treasury in the form of 
company equity worth ca 390 million zloty (Grzegorczyk 
2000; Tomaszkiewicz 2000). The cost of the assistance 
granted to PKO BP is estimated in sub-section 5.2.
5. The costs of banking sector restructuring
5.1. Costs incurred by the State Treasury
Costs of assistance granted to state-owned banks resulted 
from the cost of servicing their restructuring bonds and 
were  primarily  borne  by  the  State  Treasury.  As  the 
restructuring  bonds  were  given  to  the  banks  free  of   
charge, in subsequent years the state budget incurred 
costs related to the redemption of the securities principal 
and interest instalments. The State Treasury repurchased 
some  restructuring  bonds  before  maturity16  to  reduce 
bond servicing costs which were relatively high because 
of the capitalisation of unpaid interests.
15 Based on the NBP Act of January 31, 1989.
16 For example on 30 November 2001, bonds from series A were purchased for 
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 By May 2005 all bonds from A, B, C and D series 
had  been  redeemed  and  in  December  2006  the  State 
Treasury’s  debt  related  to  BGŻ  restructuring  bonds 
amounted to 482.9 million zloty. Table 2 shows the costs 
borne  by  the  state  budget  in  the  years  1995–2006,  in 
relation both to the current servicing and redemption of 
restructuring bonds before maturity.
 The  total  nominal  costs  incurred  by  the  State 
Treasury in relation to servicing restructuring bonds in 
the years 1995–2006 amounted to over 15 billion zloty. 
The total value of these costs will grow insignificantly 
following further servicing of securities issued for BGŻ. 
At  this  point  it  should  be  mentioned  that  the  State   
Treasury  has  not  been  charged  with  all  the  costs  of 
servicing  restructuring  bonds.  Some  costs  have  been 
incurred by the Fund for Privatisation of Polish Banks 
(FPBP) in relation to the redemption of bonds from series 
A before maturity (on 31 July 1998 it represented the 
amount of 1,218.535 million zloty and on 31 July 1999 
– 313.730 million zloty). The total amount contributed 
by  FPBP  to  servicing  restructuring  bonds  stands  at 
1,532.266 million zloty (Cf. Szelągowska 2004).
 Moreover, the State Treasury bore additional costs 
related to the capitalisation of PKO BP with shares in 
companies with the value of approximately 390 million 
zloty in 2001. The costs of assistance granted to PKO BP 
are discussed below in sub-section 5.2.
 One way of thinking about the assistance of the State 
Treasury to state-owned banks is that this assistance was 
just a transfer of funds from the owner of the bank to the 
bank and therefore it cannot be considered as a cost, but 
rather as the change in the structure of assets owned by 
the Treasury. However, if the state-owned banks had not 
needed assistance, the Treasury would have been able 
to use the funds for other purposes. Therefore the funds 
transferred  to  the  bank  are  treated  in  this  study  as  a 
proxy of costs borne by the Treasury to avoid the failure 
of the bank. A similar approach was adopted by Tang et 
al. (2000), Zoli (2001), Iwanicz-Drozdowska (2002) and 
Sherif (2003).
5.2. Restructuring costs incurred by the NBP
The central bank was involved in the restructuring of 
banks  and  granted  assistance  in  various  forms.  Such 
financial  support  did  not  always  generate  costs  for 
the NBP. For example, refinancing credits extended by 
the  NBP  bore  market  interest  rates  and  they  are  not 
considered to be a cost. The costs of the restructuring 
incurred  by  the  NBP  in  the  years  1993–2006  are 
presented  below,  together  with  the  description  of  the 
applied methodology.
Costs related to promissory notes incurred by the 
NBP have been treated as costs borne by the NBP via 
assistance granted to banks in the form of promissory 
note  credit  and  absorbing  surplus  liquidity  from  the 
market  in  the  amount  corresponding  to  the  credit 
amount. As the annual interest rate of promissory note 
credit was 1%, the cost for the NBP was the amount of 
credit multiplied by the difference between the official 
repo rate and the rate of promissory note credit. Costs 
in the following years have been calculated using data 
on repurchased notes at the end of the year. It has been 
assumed that the average annual value of repurchased 
notes is equal to the arithmetic average of the value of 
notes at the end of the previous year and at the end of 
Table 2.  Budget costs arising from the servicing and redemption of restructuring bonds 
in the years 1995–2006
Year
Restructuring bonds – related costs borne by the state budget (in millions of zloty)
Restructuring bonds of series A, B, C, D Restructuring bonds of BGŻ issued in 1996
Total
interest principal interest principal
1995 142.9 208.1 – – 350.9
1996 292.0 443.9 – – 735.9
1997 322.2 530.2 – – 852.4
1998 353.9 634.6 104.8 63.6 1,156.8
1999 320.4 625.6 78.5 71.3 1,095.8
2000 310.6 670.3 89.1 202.6 1,272.5
2001 324.4 957.2 80.5 73.7 1,435.7
2002 305.3 1,054.4 51.0 81.1 1,491.7
2003 263.2 1,116.4 26.5 85.9 1,492.1
2004 212.7 796.3 20.3 88.9 1,118.3
2005 112.3 3,718.8 20.2 91.9 3,943.1
2006 – – 12.3 94.8 107.1
 Total 2,959.9 10,755.6 471.0 853.7 15,052.5
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the current year. The average value of notes repurchased 
during a given year is multiplied by the average repo rate 
minus 1 p.p. (the interest rate of promissory notes). The 
average repo rate has been calculated as the arithmetic 
average of the repo rate at the beginning of each month 
of the year.  
Costs  related  to  the  redemption  of  bonds  issued 
by threatened banks have been treated as NBP’s costs 
incurred by the purchase of bonds of individual banks. 
As the annual interest rate of these bonds was 1%, the 
cost has been calculated as the value of bond multiplied 
by the difference between the official repo rate and the 
bonds’ interest rate. The repo rate is the rate at which 
NBP  could  borrow  money  on  the  financial  market  in 
order  to  maintain  an  appropriate  liquidity  level  on 
the market. The costs for a given year were calculated 
using the average annual value of redeemed bonds. The 
average annual value of redeemed bonds is equal to the 
arithmetic average of the value of bonds at the end of the 
previous and current year.  The average value of bonds 
held by the NBP during a given year is multiplied by 
the average repo rate minus 1 p.p. (the interest rate of 
papers). The average repo rate has been calculated as the 
arithmetic average of the repo rate at the beginning of 
each month of the year. For 1993, the difference between 
the rediscount rate from 1993 and the figure being the 
difference between the rediscount rate and the repo rate 
in 1994 was used.
Costs related to the exemption of banks from the 
reserve requirement have been calculated as the sum 
of  costs  related  to  the  exemption  of  individual  banks 
(except for PKO BP) from the reserve requirement. The 
cost of exempting one bank from the reserve requirement 
has been estimated by multiplying the fraction which 
corresponds to the part of the year when such exemption 
was in force, by the average repo rate in that year and 
by the amount exempted from the reserve requirement 
at the beginning of the exemption period.17 The repo 
rate is the rate at which the NBP could execute open 
market operations in order to maintain an appropriate 
liquidity  level  on  that  market.  Since  May  2004  the 
reserve requirement funds bear the rate of interest of 0.9 
of the rediscount rate. In practice this means that the 
cost of annual exemption from the reserve requirement 
in the years 2004–2006 amounted to some 0.15% of the 
exempted amount.
Costs  related  to  purchase  and  sale  of  banks’ 
shares have been calculated on the basis of the value of 
purchase/re-sale transactions of banks’ shares. In each 
month, the accumulated amount spent on the purchase 
of shares has been multiplied by the average repo rate 
(divided by 12) from that month. The amount received 
from the re-sale of shares has been deducted from the 
figure  obtained  in  this  way,  producing  monthly  costs 
of  servicing  banks’  shares.  Annual  costs  have  been 
calculated as the sum of monthly costs.
Table 3 shows estimates of costs borne by the NBP 
in  the  years  1993–2006  excluding  assistance  for  BGŻ 
and PKO BP.
The  costs  of  the  conversion  of  the  refinancing 
credit  for  central  investment  projects  (67.5  million 
zloty)  into  a  subordinated  loan  for  BGŻ  have  been 
17 As the amount exempted from the reserve requirement usually kept growing 
in the following years, the amount is likely to be underestimated.
Table 3.  Estimated costs of NBP’s assistance for bankruptcy threatened banks  
(in millions of zloty)
Year
NBP costs related  
to promissory  
note credit
NBP costs related  
to repurchase  
of bonds
Costs related to the 
exemption of commer-
cial banks from  
the reserve  
requirement
Costs related to the 
exemption of co- 
-operative banks from 
the reserve  
requirement
Net costs of purchase 
of banks’ shares  
by NBP
1993 11.9 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.8
1994 49.2 20.5 1.0 0.0 15.9
1995 79.3 33.6 17.3 3.8 28.2
1996 67.7 17.8 59.1 11.5 38.8
1997 79.8 10.6 108.9 25.3 38.6
1998 72.0 9.4 104.1 26.1 11.3
1999 39.7 5.9 86.8 20.3 0.0
2000 40.8 7.0 141.7 17.7 0.0
2001 27.9 5.1 252.9 4.9 0.0
2002 12.7 2.1 97.9 0.0 0.0
2003 6.9 0.7 61.4 0.0 0.0
2004 6.0 0.0 8.7 0.0 0.0
2005 4.2 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0
2006 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Note: The costs do not include assistance for PKO BP and the outstanding credit for Agrobank SA (1.5 million zloty).
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calculated  by  deducting  interest  on  the  subordinated 
loan  from  interest  on  the  potential  refinancing  credit 
for  central  investment  projects  in  each  year  of  the 
subordinated loan duration. These calculations use the 
interest  rate  of  the  NBP  refinancing  credit  for  central 
investment  projects  (one  of  the  central  bank’s  tools) 
and the interest rate of the subordinated loan for BGŻ, 
amounting to 1% per year.
The  costs  of  assistance  for  PKO  BP  include  the 
costs of converting bonds and funds from the exempted 
reserves  totalling  4  billion  zloty  into  a  rolled-over  3-
month time deposit in 2001.18 These costs also include 
the  cost  of  servicing  4  equal  tranches  of  91-day  NBP 
money bills purchased by PKO BP with the total face 
18 Interests accrued on 2 January 2002 were included into interests from 2001.
value 7.5 billion zloty and their roll-over until the end of 
2001.19 Moreover, the cost of recapitalisation of the bank 
in 2000 by the State Treasury with shares of companies, 
valued  at  some  390  million  zloty,  has  been  included, 
although this was not cost incurred by the NBP.
The above mentioned costs of assistance for PKO BP 
amount to 1 200.2 million zloty. The cost of converting 
bonds  and  funds  from  the  reserve  requirement  into 
a time deposit in the NBP has been calculated in the 
following way:20
19 Interests repaid in January 2002 were included into costs of 2001.
20 The costs presented here are broken into NBP’s assistance tools. The same 
result would be obtained by deducting the amount of 3.2 billion PLN, multiplied 
by the inflation rate, from the amount of interest earned from the PLN 4.0 billion 
deposited in the NBP.
Table 4.  Cost of assistance for PKO BP SA
Type of assistance Costs (in millions of zloty)
Purchase of bonds from PKO BP 332.8
Exemption from the reserve requirement 124.0
Servicing 3-month time deposit (rolled-over) in the NBP 222.4
Servicing 91-day NBP money bills (rolled-over) 131.0
Recapitalisation of the bank with shares of companies  390 *          
Total 1,200.2
* Grzegorczyk (2000) and Tomaszkiewicz (2000).
Source: own calculations on the basis of NBP data. 










































  in millions of zloty in % GDP
1993 11.9 3.3  – – 0.8 – – 16.0 56.9 0.01
1994 49.2 20.5 1.0 – 15.9 – – 86.6 233.0 0.04
1995 79.3 33.6 21.1 350.9 28.2 – – 513.1 1 079.7 0.15
1996 67.7 17.8 70.6 735.9 38.8 – 4.1 934.8 1 640.7 0.22
1997 79.8 10.6 134.2 852.4 38.6 – 16.8 1,132.3 1 729.7 0.22
1998 72.0 9.4 130.2 1,156.8 11.3 – 16.0 1,395.7 1 907.0 0.23
1999 39.7 5.9 107.2 1,095.8 – – 11.2 1,259.7 1 604.1 0.19
2000 40.8 7.0 159.4 1,272.5 – – 14.2 1,494.0 1 727.9 0.20
2001 27.9 5.1 257.8 1,435.7 – 1,200.2 12.4 2,939.2 3 222.2 0.38
2002 12.7 2.1 97.9 1,491.7 – – 6.9 1,611.2 1 733.4 0.20
2003 6.9 0.7 61.4 1,492.1 – – 4.1 1,565.2 1 670.5 0.19
2004 6.0 0.0 8.7 1,118.3 – – 4.3 1,137.2 1 172.7 0.12
2005 4.2 0.0 0.6 3,943.1 – – – 3,948.0 3 987.4 0.41
2006 1.8 0.0 0.0 590.0 – – – 591.9 591.9 0.06
Total 18 624.8 22 357.2 2.61
Note: The costs of servicing restructuring bonds in 2006 include among others the value of bonds that have not been repaid yet by the State Treasury. 
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•	 as the bonds bore an inflation-indexed interest 
rate, the 2001 inflation rate was deducted from the repo 
rate and the figure obtained in this way was multiplied 
by the value of bonds, i.e. 3,2 billion zloty,
•	 the  costs  of  exempting  PKO  BP  from  the 
reserve requirement in 2001 have been calculated in the 
same way as for other banks,
•	 the costs of servicing the 4 billion zloty deposit 
have  been  calculated  by  multiplying  the  deposited 
amount  by  the  repo  rate  and  deducting  the  resulting 
figure from the interest earned on the deposit.
The cost of servicing money bills has been calculated 
as interest earned by PKO BP in 2001 (on 91-day money 
bills of the NBP), diminished by the amount of interest 
the  NBP  would  have  paid  for  borrowing  the  same 
amount at the repo rate in the same period. The value 
of recapitalisation with company shares has been taken 
from press archives (Table 4).
5.3. Total public costs of the banking sector restructuring
Total  public  restructuring  costs  have  been  calculated 
as  costs  borne  by  the  State  Treasury  related  to  the 
servicing  of  restructuring  bonds  allocated  to  certain 
banks and the costs of the NBP related to promissory 
note credit, purchase of bonds and shares of bankruptcy-
threatened  banks,  the  costs  of  exempting  some  funds 
from the reserve requirement and the costs of assistance 
for PKO BP provided by both the central bank and the 
State Treasury. It should be noted that the paper does 
not take into account the costs incurred by the NBP to 
co-finance the BFG assistance fund (a fund providing 
financial assistance to bankruptcy-threatened banks),21 
nor the amounts spent on reimbursements to depositors 
of  bankrupt  banks.  In  addition,  the  paper  has  not 
included  budgetary  costs  related  to  corporate  income 
tax exemption granted mainly to co-operative banks (Cf. 
Iwanicz-Drozdowska 2002, p. 252).
Table  5  shows  the  costs  of  restructuring  of  the 
Polish banking sector broken into following years and 
assistance measures applied.
21 I.a. BFG granted a 600 million PLN loan to PKO BP in 2000.
6. Main conclusions
1. Aggregated costs of the banking sector restructuring 
borne in the years 1993-2006 by public bodies amounted 
to 18.6 billion zloty. Total real cost of the banking sector 
restructuring has been calculated in 2006 prices with 
costs  from  previous  years  having  been  recalculated 
using  the  consumer  prices  index.  Aggregated  cost  in 
2006  prices  amounted  to  22.4  billion  zloty,  which 
represents 2.61% of the annual GDP. 
2. Total costs of restructuring in Poland are not high 
as compared to other countries undergoing an economic 
transformation  from  centrally-planned  to  market 
economy.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  banking  sector 
restructuring was needed in all transition countries, and 
fiscal costs of Polish banks’ restructuring are among 
the lowest in this group of countries. The cost of state 
assistance for state-owned banks alone amounted to 18% 
of GDP in the Czech Republic, 13% of GDP in the Slovak 
Republic and 8% of GDP in Hungary (Sherif 2003; see 
also Kawalec 1999; Caprio, Klingebiel 2003).
3.  Among  the  tools  employed  in  the  banking 
sector restructuring the biggest costs are related to the 
servicing of restructuring bonds allocated by the State 
Treasury  to  problem  banks  (over  80%).  Exemptions 
from  the  reserve  requirement,  promissory  note  credit, 
recapitalisation of PKO BP with shares and the purchase 
of bonds issued by these banks had a smaller share in 
the costs.  The purchase of shares in banks by the NBP 
represented the smallest share in total costs among all 
analysed tools (Table 6). 
The  State  Treasury  assistance  for  restructuring 
banks  in  the  years  1993-2006  included  the  costs  of 
servicing restructuring bonds and the recapitalisation of 
PKO BP. These costs amounted to 15.9 billion zloty, i.e. 
2.15% of the average annual GDP in the analysed period. 
The costs of NBP assistance totalled 2.7 billion zloty, i.e. 
0.46% of the GDP. The share of State Treasury assistance 
represented 85.5%, while that of the NBP – 14.5%. In 
real terms these shares amounted to 83.7% and 16.3%, 
respectively.
Table 6.  Restructuring costs breakdown according to the financing method
Restructuring cost borne by:
Percentage share in costs
in current prices in 2006 prices
1. State Treasury: 85.5 83.7
Restructuring bonds 83.4 81.8
Recapitalisation of PKO BP with shares 2.1 1.9
2. National Bank of Poland: 14.5 16.3
Release from obligatory reserve 5.6 6.0
Promissory note credit 2.7 3.8
Purchase of bonds issued by banks 0.6 1.0
Purchase of banks’ shares 0.7 1.1
Subordinated loan for BGŻ 0.5 0.5
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4. The small share of assistance for private and 
co-operative  banks  is  a  characteristic  feature  of  the 
assistance  provided  by  public  bodies.  The  share  of 
assistance for state-owned banks was 90.3% in current 
prices. In real terms (in 2006 prices), this share totalled 
88.2%. The whole assistance of the State Treasury was 
earmarked for state-owned banks while 66.7% of NBP 
funds  was  allocated  to  bankruptcy-threatened  private 
and co-operative banks and the remaining to PKO BP 
and BGŻ (Table 7).
5. Among all banks the most significant assistance 
was extended to BGŻ. In the years 1993, 1994, and 1996 
the State Treasury granted restructuring bonds to BGŻ 
with the total value of 2.66 billion zloty, including 296.18 
million zloty that was allocated to the restructuring of 
co-operative  banks  (Cf.  Iwanicz-Drozdowska  2002).  In 
1996, the NBP provided BGŻ with a subordinated loan. 
The face value of assistance for BGŻ is estimated at 9.1 
billion zloty (10.6 billion zloty in 2006 prices), which 
represents 1.21% of GDP.
The second most assisted bank was PKO BP, which 
received  restructuring  bonds  with  the  total  value  of 
573.4 million zloty in 1993 and in 2000 shares totalling 
some 390 million zloty from the State Treasury, as well 
as a significant assistance from the  NBP that cost the 
central  bank  810.16  million  zloty  in  the  years  2001-
2002. The estimated total cost of assistance for PKO BP 
SA  was  3.45  billion  zloty  (3.99  million  zloty  in  2006 
prices), representing 0.46% of GDP.22
The share of assistance costs for BGŻ SA and PKO 
BP  SA  in  the  total  cost  of  assistance  for  the  banking 
sector amounted to 48.6% and 18.5% in current prices 
respectively. In real terms the costs are slightly smaller: 
47.4% and 17.8% respectively. 
22 In absence of detailed data on repayment of individual series of bonds, these 
figures are estimates of real costs.
6.  The  costs  of  the  banking  sector  restructuring 
in  Poland  were  spread  over  the  years  1993–2006, 
but  some  costs  will  continue  to  be  incurred  in  the 
coming years. Although the most significant problems 
in commercial and co-operative banks emerged in the 
years  1993–1996,  restructuring  costs  were  the  lowest 
in that period. In the years 1993–1996 the total costs 
amounted to 1.6 billion zloty (3.0 billion zloty in 2006 
prices), representing 0.42% of the annual GDP23. The 
costs continued to grow until 2001, when the flow of 
capital to banks reached 2.93 billion zloty mostly due to 
the assistance for PKO BP SA. In subsequent years the 
value of funds went down, and it grew again in 2005, 
reaching 3.95 billion zloty.24 Moreover, as of the end of 
2006, the State Treasury’s debt related to bonds given to 
BGŻ SA was still 482.9 million zloty.
A question that remains open is how large would 
the social and economic cost and the cost of the financial 
sector in Poland have been, if public institutions had 
refrained  from  helping  threatened  banks.  A  potential 
loss  of  confidence  in  the  banking  sector  could  have 
been  particularly  dangerous  in  the  initial  stage  of 
its  development  and  would  have  certainly  delayed 
the  establishment  of  strong  financial  institutions  in 
Poland. The measurement of social and macroeconomic 
costs of refraining from helping banks threatened with 
bankruptcy seems a very difficult task. On the contrary, 
some  costs  incurred  by  the  Treasury  to  assist  state-
owned  banks  had  probably  a  major  impact  on  the 
stream of bank privatization revenues. Comparing the 
hypothetical  scenarios  and  opportunity  costs  of  crisis 
resolution  methods  is  an  important  issue  and  future 
studies may address this problem.
23 For international comparison the years 1993-1996 could be defined as the 
“crisis period“ and the years following this period could be called the “post-
crisis period”.
24 Mainly due to redemption of restructuring bonds by the State Treasury before 
maturity.
Table 7.  Restructuring costs breakdown according to beneficiaries and funding institutions
Assistance for banks
Percentage share of assistance  
in total costs
Percentage share of state institu-
tions in assistance for individual 
banks (in current prices)
Percentage share of state institu-
tions in assistance for individual 
banks (in 2006 prices)
in current  
prices in 2006 prices State Treasury NBP State Treasury NBP
1.  State banks
     including: 90.3 88.2 94.7 5.3 94.9 5.1
BGŻ 48.6 47.4 99.0 1.0 98.9 1.1
PKO BP  18.5 17.8 76.5 23.5 77.7 22.3
2. Private and  
    co-operative banks* 9.7* 11.8* 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
Note: *excluding assistance in the form of bonds given to BGŻ by State Treasury. BGŻ was to allocate some of the funds to the restructuring of co-operative banks.
Source: own calculations on the basis of NBP and Ministry of Finance data.95 Bank i kredyt sierpień-wrzesień 2007 Rynki i Instytucje Finansowe   
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